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Abstract
Reinforcement learning is a promising approach to learning control policies for
complex robotics tasks. A key challenge is ensuring safety of the learned control
policy—e.g., that a walking robot does not fall over, or a quadcopter does not run
into a wall. We focus on the setting where the dynamics are known, and the goal
is to prove that a policy learned in simulation satisfies a given safety constraint.
Existing approaches for ensuring safety suffer from a number of limitations—e.g.,
they do not scale to high-dimensional state spaces, or they only ensure safety for
a fixed environment. We propose an approach based on shielding, which uses a
backup controller to override the learned controller as necessary to ensure that
safety holds. Rather than compute when to use the backup controller ahead-of-time,
we perform this computation online. By doing so, we ensure that our approach
is computationally efficient, and furthermore, can be used to ensure safety even
in novel environments. We empirically demonstrate that our approach can ensure
safety in experiments on cart-pole and on a bicycle with random obstacles.
1 Introduction
Reinforcement learning is a promising approach to automatically synthesizing control policies for
robotics tasks [10, 15]. However, a key challenge to enabling usage on real robots is the inability to
provide safety guarantees for learned control policies. For example, we may want to ensure that a
walking robot does not fall over, or that a quadcopter does not run into an obstacle.
We consider the setting where a control policy is learned in simulation, and the goal is to use it to
control a real robot. We assume that the robot dynamics are known, but the environment may not
be known ahead of time. As a concrete example, consider flying a quadcopter. We have very good
models of the quadcopter dynamics. However, we may want to use the quadcopter in many different
environments, with different configurations of obstacles (e.g., walls, buildings, and trees). We assume
that perception is accurate—i.e., we know the positions of the obstacles. Our goal is to ensure that a
given learned control policy for the quadcopter is safe when faced with a possibly novel environment.
Existing approaches to safe reinforcement learning rely on ahead-of-time verification of the desired
safety property. For example, one approach is to directly verify that the learned control policy is
safe [8, 25, 7, 14]. An alternative approach is to use a shield policy, which overrides the learned
policy with a safe backup policy as necessary to ensure safety [20, 13, 3, 9, 4]. 1 The goal is to use
the learned policy as often as possible. For example, the backup policy may bring the quadcopter to a
stop if it goes near an obstacle. This approach implicitly verifies safety of the joint policy (i.e., the
combination of the learned policy and the backup policy) ahead-of-time.
These existing approaches have several limitations. First, ahead-of-time verification can be compu-
tationally infeasible—it requires checking whether safety holds from every possible state, which
can scale exponentially in the dimension of the state space. Many existing approaches only scale to
1More generally, the shield can simply constrain the set of allowed actions in a way that ensures safety.
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2-3 dimensions [13, 8]. Second, existing algorithms typically focus on verifying a property of the
robot dynamics in isolation of its environment (e.g., positions of obstacles) or with respect to a fixed
environment. To handle novel environments, they must either verify all possible environments ahead-
of-time, or run verification from scratch every time a novel environment is encountered. Finally, many
existing approaches focus on stability, which says that the robot remains within some constrained
region of the state space, yet we typically want robots that engage in dynamic behavior, such as
walking [10], flying [13, 3], or driving [16]. Verifying safety for dynamic behaviors is challenging,
and most existing approaches can only do so over a finite time horizon [7, 9, 14] or in some bounded
region of the state space [13, 3, 8]. We discuss in more detail in Appendix A.
Contributions. Our key insight is that these challenges arise since existing approaches rely on
ahead-of-time verification. In this paper, we propose an approach to safe reinforcement learning that
ensures safety online. Our approach is based on the concept of shielding, where we occasionally
override the learned policy with a backup policy to ensure safety. However, in contrast to previous
approaches, our algorithm computes whether to use the learned policy or a backup policy on-the-fly.
Intuitively, it maintains the invariant that the backup policy can always recover the system—in
particular, it only uses the learned policy if it can prove that doing so maintains this invariant.
Our approach assumes given a safe policy, which ensures safety, but is only applicable on a restricted
portion of the state space. A typical choice for the safe policy is a linear quadratic regular (LQR)
synthesized to stabilize the robot near some fixed point. For example, for a walking robot, it may
stabilize the robot near an upright, standing position, and for a quadcopter, it may stabilize the
quadcopter near a hovering position with zero velocity.
Then, our algorithm learns a recovery policy that tries to bring the system to a state where the safe
policy is applicable. For example, consider a walking robot, and a learned policy that makes the robot
run. The recovery policy may slow down the robot, bringing it close to a standing position where the
safe policy can be applied. In summary, the backup policy consists of using the recovery policy until
it is close to a standing position, and then using the safe policy.
Finally, our algorithm ensures safety by maintaining the invariant that the recovery policy can safely
stop the robot. In particular, to compute whether to use the learned policy or the backup policy, it
checks whether using the learned policy maintains this invariant. If so, then it uses the learned policy.
Otherwise, it uses the backup policy—by the invariant, doing so is guaranteed to be safe. As long as
the robot starts from a state where the invariant holds, then the invariant holds indefinitely.
We empirically evaluate our approach on the cart-pole and a bicycle model. We show how our
approach can be used to ensure safety for dynamical robot tasks and when there are random obstacles.
We also demonstrate the scalability of our approach compared to ahead-of-time verification. In
particular, while our approach incurs runtime overhead during computation of the policy, each
computation is efficient. In contrast, ahead-of-time verification suffers from exponential blowup in
the computational cost. Even when this computation is offline, it can be infeasible for problems of
interest; furthermore, verification may have to be performed from scratch if a novel environment is
encountered. Finally, our benchmark is dynamic (i.e., the goal is not stabilization), so unlike our
approach, verification can only ensure safety for a finite horizon or bounded region of the state space.
Related work. There has been much recent interest in safe reinforcement learning [12, 5]. One
approach is to use constrained reinforcement learning to learn policies that satisfy a safety con-
straint [2, 26]. However, these approaches typically do not guarantee safety.
Another approach is to learn a control policy, and then verify ahead-of-time that the learned policy is
safe [25, 7, 14]. However, as we show in our experiments, these approaches typically do not scale
well. Also, verification does not provide a way to modify unsafe policies to obtain a safe policy. One
solution is to compose policies proven to be safe on different portions of the state space [22, 28]. A
special case is shielding, which composes the learned policy with a safe backup policy [20, 13, 4].
However, existing approaches rely on ahead-of-time verification, and thus scale poorly.
We focus on the case where the dynamics are known, and reinforcement learning is used in simulation
to learn a policy. Another use of reinforcement learning is when the dynamics are initially unknown,
and the goal is to learn a control policy from real-world experience. There has been work on safe
exploration that aims to ensure safety in this setting [17, 13, 3, 24, 27, 8, 11]. These approaches also
rely on verification; we believe our approach can be integrated with these approaches.
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2 Preliminaries
Given an arbitrary control policy pˆi, our goal is to minimally modify pˆi to obtain a safe control policy
pishield for which safety is guaranteed to hold (given some constraints on the initial state).
Dynamics and control. We consider a deterministic, discrete time dynamical system with continuous
states X ⊆ RnX , continuous actions U ⊆ RnU , dynamics f : X × U → X , and initial state
distribution d0 over X . Given a control policy pi : X → U , we let f (pi)(x) = f(x, pi(x)) denote the
joint dynamics. Given control policy pi and initial state x0, the trajectory generated by pi from x0 is
the infinite sequence of states x0, x1, ..., where for all t ≥ 1, xt = f (pi)(xt−1). We assume that f is a
polynomial of degree d. 2 We describe the necessary assumptions on initial states in Section 3.
Remark 2.1. As in prior work [22], for systems that are not polynomial, we use local degree 5 Taylor
approximations. While our theoretical safety guarantees rely on polynomial dynamics, we find that
safety holds in practice since these approximations are very accurate.
Shielding. We consider a safety property specified as a safe region Xsafe ⊆ X—i.e., the entire
trajectory generated by a control policy from an initial state should be contained in Xsafe. We assume
that Xsafe has form Xsafe = {x ∈ X | Asafex ≤ bsafe}, where Asafe ∈ Rk×nX and bsafe ∈ Rk for some
k ∈ N—i.e., Xsafe is the intersection of finitely many half-spaces. Given an initial state x0 ∈ X , a
safe region Xsafe, and a control policy pi, we say pi is safe starting from x0 if xt ∈ X for all t ≥ 0.
Consider a control policy pˆi : X → U . We make no assumptions about pˆi; e.g., it may be a neural
network policy trained using reinforcement learning. Given pˆi, our goal is to synthesize a control
policy pishield that is (i) safe from as many initial states as possible, and (ii) achieves as high of a
reward as possible. Given initial state distribution d0 over X , rewards R : X → R, and a discount
factor γ ∈ [0, 1], we can formalize (i) as maximizing the safety probability
p
(pishield)
safe = Px0∼d0 [pishield safe starting at x0],
and we can formalize (ii) as maximizing the cumulative expected time-discounted reward
J (pishield) = Ex0∼d0
[ ∞∑
t=0
γtR(xt)
]
,
where x0, x1, ... is the trajectory generated by pishield from x0.
Our approach is to synthesize a control policy pishield that equals pˆi as often as possible, but overrides
pˆi when it cannot validate that using pˆi is safe. In contrast to prior work on shielding [13, 3, 4], we
compute whether to use pˆi or the backup policy on-the-fly rather than ahead of time.
LQR targets. Our approach uses stabilizing control to construct pishield. Given a state-action pair
(x˜, u˜) ∈ X × U , we can use a linear quadratic regulator (LQR), which is a control policy piLQR, to
stabilize the system near (x˜, u˜). Furthermore, we can use LQR verification techniques to compute
regions within which the LQR controller is guaranteed to be safe [18, 22].
To leverage these techniques, our algorithm takes as input a LQR target mapping ρ : X → X × U .
Given a state x ∈ X , ρ returns an LQR target ρ(x) = (x˜, u˜) around which we can try to stabilize
the system. For example, consider the cart-pole, which has states of the form x = (z, v, θ, ω) ∈ R4,
where z is the cart position, v is cart velocity, θ is the pole angle (with θ = 0 denoting the upright
pole), and ω is the pole angular velocity, and actions of the form u ∈ R representing the cart
acceleration. Then, we can use ρ((z, v, θ, ω)) = ((z, 0, 0, 0), 0). In other words, ρ(x) is a state where
the pole is upright and both the cart and the pole are not moving, together with an action where
the cart acceleration is zero. Other examples of ρ(x) include a walking robot standing upright, a
quadcopter hovering at a position, or a swimming robot treading water.
Remark 2.2. Note that not any state x˜ ∈ X can be stabilized using LQR control. For example, in the
cart-pole system, if v 6= 0, then it is impossible to stabilize the system, since xt+1 changes regardless
of the control policy pi—in particular, the dynamics for the cart position are zt+1 = zt + vt, so
zt+1 6= zt unless vt = 0. While our safety guarantees hold for arbitrary ρ(x), our shielded control
policy performs better if we can stabilize the system near ρ(x).
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Algorithm 1 Run pishield from initial state x.
procedure RUNWITHSHIELD(pˆi, pirec, x)
(x˜, u˜)← ρ(x)
while true do
u, (x˜, u˜)← SHIELD(pˆi, pirec, x, (x˜, u˜))
x← f(x, u)
end while
end procedure
procedure SHIELD(pˆi, pirec, x, (x˜, u˜))
piLQR, V ← LQRCONTROL(x˜, u˜)
G ← LQRVERIFY(x˜, u˜, piLQR, V )
if ISRECOVERABLE(pirec, f (pˆi)(x)) then
return pˆi(x), ρ(f (pˆi)(x))
else if x ∈ G then
return piLQR(x), (x˜, u˜)
else
return pirec(x), ρ(f (pirec)(x))
end if
end procedure
Algorithm 2 Check if x is recoverable.
procedure ISRECOVERABLE(pirec, x)
for t ∈ {0, 1, ..., T − 1} do
(x˜, u˜)← ρ(x)
piLQR, V ← LQRCONTROL(x˜, u˜)
G ← LQRVERIFY(x˜, u˜, piLQR, V )
if x ∈ G then
return true
else if x 6∈ Xsafe then
return false
end if
x← f (pirec)(x)
end for
return false
end procedure
3 Online Shielding Algorithm
Overview. At a high level, at each step, the shield pishield constructed by our algorithm checks
whether using the given control policy pˆi is safe. If so, then pishield(x) = pˆi(x); otherwise, pishield(x) =
pibackup(x), where pibackup is a backup controller that is guaranteed to be safe.
More concretely, the backup controller consists of two parts: (i) a recovery policy pirec that attempts
to transition the robot into a state that can be stabilized, and (ii) an LQR piLQR that can be used once
the robot is in a state where it can be stabilized. We refer to a state x ∈ X such that an LQR piLQR
can be used to stabilize x as stable. For example, consider a running robot. Stable states are those
where the robot is near a motionless, standing position. However, states where the robot is running
are not stable, since piLQR cannot stabilize the robot. Then, pirec might try to slow the robot down until
it reaches a standing position; from there, piLQR can be used to stabilize the robot.
The challenge is that we have no guarantees about the performance of pirec; instead, pishield is designed
to work with any recovery policy. The key idea is that a state x ∈ X is recoverable if pirec can
successfully transition the robot from x to a stable state. Then, to check whether it is safe to use
pˆi, the shield checks if x′ = f (pˆi)(x) is recoverable—it does so simply by simulating f (pirec) from
x′. If x′ is recoverable, then it is safe to use pˆi. If not, then since x is recoverable, it is safe to use
pibackup—i.e., either piLQR if x is stable, or pirec otherwise.
Finally, our theoretical guarantee says that pishield is guaranteed to be safe from any initial state
x0 ∈ X that is recoverable. Note that this guarantee depends on the recovery policy pirec. In general,
any stable state is also recoverable, but pirec enlarges the set of recoverable states. Continuing our
example, a state is recoverable as long as pirec can successfully slow the robot down until it is standing
upright. Thus, even though the robot is never in a stable state, pishield can safely continue running
using pˆi as long as it knows that it can stop itself using pirec.
Our algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1. The subroutine SHIELD implements pishield, and the subroutine
RUNWITHSHIELD controls the system using pishield. The subroutine ISRECOVERABLE shown in
Algorithm 2 checks if a given state x ∈ X is recoverable. We describe the components of our
algorithm in more detail in the following sections. Note that pishield takes an auxiliary input (x˜, u˜),
which is a current LQR target for the system; we describe the purpose of this auxiliary input below.
Remark 3.1. Note that our algorithm has to perform the check ISRECOVERABLE on every step.
While the complexity of this computation is linear in T , it nevertheless adds overhead compared to
2Throughout, polynomial refers to a multivariate polynomial over x ∈ X with real coefficients.
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simply using pˆi. To handle this issue, we can safely add a time out, and have ISRECOVERABLE return
false if it runs out of time (i.e., default to using the backup policy).
LQR control. Our algorithm uses LQR control to try and stabilize the system when near an LQR
target ρ(x) = (x˜, u˜). In particular, a linear quadratic regulator (LQR) piLQR, which has form
piLQR(x) = Kx for some K ∈ RnU×nX , is the optimal controller for the linear dynamical system
f˜(x, u) = Ax + Bu, where A ∈ RnX×nX and B ∈ RnX×nU , with rewards R(x, u) = x>Qx +
u>Ru, where Q ∈ RnX×nX and R ∈ RnU×nU . Note that the joint dynamics are f (piLQR)(x) =
(A+BK)x. An LQR problem instance is specified by (A,B,R,Q); given such a problem instance,
the LQR algorithm either returns piLQR, or ∅ if the dynamics cannot be stabilized.
Given an LQR target ρ(x) = (x˜, u˜), LQRCONTROL constructs an LQR problem instance based on a
linear approximation f˜ of f around (x˜, u˜), and then returns the LQR piLQR (or ∅) for this problem
instance. This algorithm is standard [22, 23], so we omit details. Intuitively, piLQR attempts to stabilize
the dynamics f around the given LQR target (x˜, u˜). Since the linear approximation f˜ of f becomes
arbitrarily accurate close to (x˜, u˜), we intuitively expect piLQR to be a good control policy.
As we discuss below, we can compute regions on which piLQR is guaranteed to be safe. In addition
to returning piLQR, LQRCONTROL also returns a function V (x) = x>Px, where P ∈ RnX×nX is a
positive semidefinite matrix. The function V is used to help compute safe regions for piLQR.
LQR verification. We use LQR verification to compute a region in which the LQR piLQR(x) = Kx
is guaranteed to be safe [18, 22, 23]. Given a policy pi, a set G ⊆ X is invariant for pi if for any initial
state x0 ∈ G, the trajectory generated by pi from x0 is contained in G. Thus, if the system starts in the
region G, then it remains in G for all time. The following result follows by induction on t.
Theorem 3.2. Let pi be a control policy. Suppose that there exists V : X → R≥0 satisfying
V (x) ≥ V (f (pi)(x)) (∀x ∈ G = {x ∈ X | V (x) ≤ }), (1)
where  ∈ R≥0 is some constant. Then, G is an invariant set for pi.
We call V a Lyapunov function. By Theorem 3.2, given a candidate Lyapunov function V , we can use
optimization to compute  such that G is invariant. In particular, for a set F of functions X → R, a
control policy pi, and a candidate Lyapunov function V , consider the following optimization problem:
 = max
λ∈F,~µ∈Fk,′∈R
′ (2)
subj. to V (x)− V (f (pi)(x)) + λ(x)(V (x)− ′) ≥ 0 (∀x ∈ RnX )
bsafe −Asafex+ ~µ(x)(V (x)− ′) ≥ 0 (∀x ∈ RnX )
λ(x), ~µ(x), ′ ≥ 0 (∀x ∈ RnX ).
Theorem 3.3. Let  be the solution to (2); (i) G is invariant for pi, and (ii) pi is safe from any x0 ∈ G.
We give a proof in Appendix B. In general, the optimization problem (2) may be intractable. To
obtain a tractable variant, we assume that the candidate Lyapunov function V is a polynomial in x,
and that F is the set of polynomials in x of degree at most d′. Then, for pi = piLQR, the left-hand side
of each constraint in (2) are also polynomials in x, since piLQR(x) = Kx is linear.
Finally, we can replace each of these constraints with the stronger constraint that the polynomial is a
sum-of-squares (SOS). In particular, a polynomial p(x) is SOS if p(x) = p1(x)2 + ...+ pk(x)2 for
some polynomials p1, ..., pk. If p(x) is SOS, then p(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X . With this modification,
(2) is an SOS program. For the case where F is the set of of polynomials of bounded degree d′, an
SOS program can be relaxed to a semidefinite program [18, 22, 23], which can be solved efficiently.
Together, our approach to solving (2) is sound—i.e., the constraints in (2) are guaranteed to be
satisfied by our solution λ, ~µ, , so the statement of Theorem 3.3 holds. However, there may exist a
solution even if we conclude that (2) is infeasible, or there may exist a better solution than ours (i.e.,
larger ). Nevertheless, in practice, these approximations appear to be fairly tight [22].
Finally, a standard choice for the candidate Lyapunov function V is the cost-to-go function (i.e., the
negative value function) of piLQR, which is computed as part of the LQR algorithm. In particular, this
function has the form V (x) = x>Px, where P ∈ RnX×nX , so it is a polynomial. Furthermore, we
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are guaranteed that P is positive semidefinite, so V (x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X . It can be shown that V is
a Lyapunov function for piLQR for the linear approximation f˜ , which makes it a promising choice for
a Lyapunov function for the true dynamics f .
In summary, LQRVERIFY solves the SOS variant of (2) for the LQR piLQR(x) = Kx and the
candidate Lyapunov function V (x) = x>Px, and returns the safe region G (or ∅ if piLQR = ∅, or if
the system cannot be provably stabilized). Finally, we say x ∈ X is (x˜, u˜)-stable if x ∈ G, where
G = LQRVERIFY(x˜, u˜, piLQR, V ) where piLQR, V = LQRCONTROL(x˜, u˜).
In other words, x is in the invariant set G for the LQR piLQR for the LQR target (x˜, u˜). We say simply
that x is stable if x is ρ(x)-stable. We can check stability by computing G and checking if x ∈ G.
Remark 3.4. In practice, we can often precompute an invariant set for all possible LQR targets
(x˜, u˜), due to some symmetry in the system. For example, our LQR targets for the cart-pole only vary
in the position z of the system. Since the dynamics are equivariant under translation, we can compute
the invariant set G for z = 0; then, the invariant set for general z is simply G translated by z.
Recovery policy. Our algorithm takes as input a recovery policy pirec. Ideally, pirec should try to
transition the system to a stable state. Our algorithm works with any given pirec, but the cumulative
reward achieved depends on the quality of pirec—pishield uses pˆi more frequently if pirec is higher quality.
Given a recovery policy pirec, we can define a notion of whether a state x ∈ X is recoverable—i.e.,
whether pirec can safely transition from x to a stable state x′. More precisely, given pirec and a time
horizon T ∈ N, a state x ∈ X is recoverable if for the trajectory
x0 = x (3)
xt+1 = f
(pirec)(xt) (∀t ∈ [T ]),
there exists t′ ∈ [T ] = {0, 1, ..., T − 1} such that x0, ..., xt′ ∈ Xsafe and xt′ is stable. To check
whether a given state x ∈ X is recoverable, we simulate the trajectory (3) and check the recoverability
condition for each state xt′ for t′ ∈ [T ]. Algorithm 2 returns whether a given state is recoverable.
To train pirec, we sample a random initial state x0 ∼ d0, and then sample a random horizon t ∈ N (e.g.,
uniformly on some large horizon T ′ ∈ N). Next, we simulate the system using the learned policy pˆi
for t steps to obtain xt. Finally, we reject xt if xt 6∈ Xsafe. In this way, we obtain a distribution drec
over X . Finally, we use reinforcement learning to train pirec to recover the state using the rewards
Rrec(x) = I[x is stable], where I is the indicator function. We can also use a shaped reward. For
example, we can use R(x) = ‖x − x˜‖2, where (x˜, u˜) = ρ(x). Assuming points near x˜ are stable,
this choice rewards states that are “closer” to being stable.
Shield policy. Intuitively, our shield pishield maintains safety depending on one of two cases. The first
case is when the system is not at a (x˜, u˜)-stable state. In this case, it maintains the invariant that x
is recoverable. In particular, it only uses pˆi if f (pˆi)(x) is recoverable. Otherwise, it uses pirec, which
ensures that f (pirec)(x) is recoverable (assuming x is recoverable).
The second case is when the system reaches a stable state x after using pirec to recover. In principle,
since x is stable, we can now use piLQR to stabilize the system, thereby ensuring safety. One subtlety
is that we have to continue using piLQR for the same LQR target (x˜, u˜)—our safety guarantee relies on
the fact that the trajectory remains inside the invariant set G, which is only guaranteed to be invariant
if piLQR does not change. In particular, the auxiliary input (x˜, u˜) to SHIELD in Algorithm 1 remains
unchanged when using piLQR. We have the following guarantee, which we prove in Appendix C.
Theorem 3.5. If x0 ∈ X is recoverable, then pishield is safe starting from x0.
4 Experiments
We evaluate our approach on two benchmarks, the cart-pole and a bicycle, showing how it ensures
safety in a scalable way. All experiments are run on a 2.9 GHz Intel Core i9 CPU with 32GB memory.
Dynamical systems. First, we consider the cart-pole [6, 1] with continuous actions. Our rewards are
for the cart to have positive velocity (i.e., move towards the right), with a target velocity of v0 = 0.1.
The safety constraint is that the pole angle does not exceed θmax = 0.15 (measured in radians) from
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Figure 1: For cart-pole (top) and bicycle (bottom): Reward (gray) and safety probability (red) for
original (left) and modified (middle) environments, and probability of using of pˆi (green), pirec (blue),
and piLQR (red) as a function of t on the original cart-pole and bicycle environments (right). For
modified cart-pole, we threshold reward at 2.0; “No Shield” achieves larger reward using unsafe
behavior. We show means (all) and standard errors (left, middle) over 100 random rollouts.
the upright position. This system is similar to a walking robot, where the goal is to walk to a target
location without falling over. The initial state distribution is Uniform([−0.5, 0.5]4).
Second, we consider a bicycle [21, 19], which has a 5-dimensional state space (xf , yf , xb, yb, v),
where (xf , yf ) is the front of the car, (xb, yb) is the back, and v is the velocity, and has a 2-
dimensional action space (a, θ), where a is the acceleration and θ is the steering angle. We assume
that |a| ≤ amax = 0.25. The goal is to get from the initial state (0.0, 0.0,−0.1, 0.0) to the target
xf = 1.0. In addition, the bicycle must avoid two obstacles, which have x positions 0.4 and 0.7, y
positions sampled i.i.d. from Uniform([−0.05, 0.05]), and radius 0.05.
Reinforcement learning. We use backpropagation-through-time (BPTT) 3 to learn pˆi and pirec. Each
policy is a neural network with a single-layer with 200 hidden units, and ReLU activations. For the
bicycle, we include the y positions of the obstacles as inputs to the neural network. For each task, we
train using a time horizon of N = 200 steps and a discount factor of γ = 0.99. We use the ADAM
optimizer, with a learning rate tuned using cross validation.
LQR verification. For the cart-pole, we use ρ((z, v, θ, ω)) = ((z, 0, 0, 0), 0)—i.e., stabilize the pole
to the origin at the current cart position. We use the degree 5 Taylor approximation around the origin
in LQR verification. We use degree 6 polynomials for F in the SOS program. For the bicycle, we use
ρ((xf , yf , xb, yb, v)) = ((xf + v · cosφ, yf + v · sinφ, xb + v · cosφ, yb + v · sinφ, 0), (0, 0))
where φ is the current angle of the bicycle (i.e., the direction it travels if θ = 0)—i.e., ρ(x) is the
point where the bicycle reaches if it moves straight in the direction it is currently moving for one time
step, and then comes to a complete stop. Since the bicycle is only moving along one dimension (i.e.,
θ = 0), we can reparameterize the dynamics so they are linear, so LQR verification is exact.
Modified dynamical systems. A common challenge with approaches to safe reinforcement learning
based on ahead-of-time verification is that they typically only apply to a specific realization of
the dynamical system. If the dynamical system changes—e.g., the positions of obstacles—then
verification has to be performed starting from scratch. As we show below, verification can be very
intractable to perform ahead-of-time, let alone on-the-fly. Yet, changes in the dynamical systems are
a major cause of safety failures, since the learned policy pˆi is tailored to perform well in the original
system. In contrast, our approach ensures safety on-the-fly by construction.
To demonstrate our advantage, we also consider a modification to each of our dynamical systems.
First, for the cart-pole, we increase the time horizon—though pˆi and pirec are trained with a time
horizon of N = 200, we use them to control the system for a time horizon of N = 1000. Second, for
the bicycle, we enlarge the obstacles to have radius 0.2, compared to 0.05 originally.
3In other words, we backpropagate through both the neural network and the dynamics.
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Figure 2: Reward (left) and time per action (middle) on modified cart-pole for pishield as a function of
T ∈ {0, 25, 50, 75, 100}, and time to verify the cart-pole policy from [7] as a function of τ (right).
We show means and standard errors over 10 random rollouts (left, middle) or 4 runs (right).
Results. In Figure 1 (left, middle), we show the reward achieved for both dynamical systems and
their respective modifications. The reward shown is the actual performance—z for cart-pole (i.e.,
distance traveled by the cart), and x for the bicycle (i.e., distance traveled towards the target)—rather
than the shaped reward used to learn pˆi. We also show the safety probability—i.e., the probability that
a random state visited during a random rollout is safe. We show results for (i) pˆi (“No Shield”), (ii)
pishield without pirec—i.e., using T = 0 (“No Recovery”), and (iii) pishield using T = 100 (“Ours”).
All of our shielded policies (i.e., both T = 0 and T = 100) achieve perfect safety. The learned policy
pˆi achieves good safety probability (1.0 for cart-pole, 0.97 for bicycle) on the original environments.
However, as expected, it performs very poorly on the modified environments (0.45 on cart-pole, 0.42
on bicycle), since it was not trained to account for these modifications. While our shielded policy
(with T = 100) achieves somewhat reduced reward compared to pˆi, it always achieves perfect safety.
Policy usage. In Figure 1 (right), for pishield with T = 100, we show the probability of using pˆi, pirec,
and piLQR as a function of time t, on the original cart-pole and bicycle environments. For cart-pole,
pishield initially uses piLQR to upright the pole, and then proceeds to use a combination of pˆi and pirec.
For the modified environment (plot omitted), pishield inevitably switches to using piLQR only—pˆi acts
pathologically (and unsafely) for states with large z, since it was not trained on these states. For the
bicycle, in about half the rollouts, pishield switches to piLQR and does not make further progress, likely
because the obstacle was blocking the way. For the remaining rollouts, pishield uses pˆi for most of the
rollout. For the modified environment (plot omitted), pishield almost always uses piLQR.
Need for a recovery policy. Our results demonstrate the importance of using pirec—when T = 0,
pishield only uses piLQR, and makes no progress. In Figure 2 (left), we additionally show how reward
varies as a function of the recovery horizon T for modified cart-pole. There is a large improvement
even for T = 25; performance then levels off, with T = 75 and T = 100 achieving similar reward.
Running time. We study the running time of pishield—i.e., how long it takes to compute a single
action u = pishield(x). In Figure 2, we show how the average running time varies as a function of the
recovery horizon T , on cart-pole. As expected, for T = 100, the running time is about 100× the
running time of pˆi (26.0ms vs. 0.2ms), since it simulates the dynamical system for 100 steps. We
believe that this overhead is an acceptable cost for guaranteeing safety. The worst case running time
is linear in T , but it can be sublinear if pirec reaches a stable state in fewer than T steps.
Comparison to ahead-of-time verification. Existing approaches to safety require that the backup
policy be verified ahead-of-time [13, 3, 8, 4]. We compare our approach to ahead-of-time verification.
One challenge is that these techniques typically only perform verification for a bounded state space
or for a bounded time horizon τ . In Figure 2, we show how the running time of a state-of-the art
verification algorithm scales as a function of τ for verifying a cart-pole policy [7]. The y-axis is
log-scale—thus, verification is exponential in τ . Even for τ = 25, it takes about 24 minutes to
perform verification. Though this computation is offline, it quickly becomes intractable for long
horizons. As a rough estimate, the running time grows 102× from τ = 10 to τ = 20; extrapolating
this trend, the running time for τ = 200 would be over 1030 years. In contrast, our approach not only
ensures safety for an unbounded horizon, but is also substantially more computationally feasible.
Conclusion. We leave much room for future work—e.g., improving the reward achieved using our
approach, extending our approach to handling uncertainty in the dynamics or partial observability,
and reducing the computational cost of our approach.
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A Limitations of Ahead-Of-Time Verification
Existing approaches to ensuring safety rely on ahead-of-time verification to ensure safety. Given a
policy pi, the goal is to prove that
φsafe ≡
∞∧
t=0
Asafext ≤ bsafe,
for every x0 ∈ X0 ⊆ X , where xt+1 = f (pi)(xt) for all t ≥ 0. Here, X0 is some set of allowed initial
states. Approaches to safe reinforcement learning either learn a policy pˆi and try to verify that pˆi is
safe, or synthesize a safe backup policy pibackup, which implicitly verifies that pibackup is safe.
A key challenge to verifying that φsafe holds is the infinite time horizon. One approach is to verify the
system over a finite time horizon [7, 9, 14]. However, as we show in our experiments, this approach
cannot ensure long-term safety. An alternative approach is to compute an invariant set in which the
system is guaranteed to stay for all time [13, 3, 8]. However, this approach only applies to systems
where the goal is for the robot to stay in a bounded region of the state space.
In addition, we noted that these approaches have difficulty handling novel environments. The reason
is that to verify all possible envrionments ahead-of-time, we would have to encode the configuration
of the environment in the state space. However, doing so quickly causes the dimension of the state
space to become very large, and verification algorithms often do not scale well to high-dimensional
state spaces, especially those that perform some form of exhaustive search [13, 3, 8]. The alternative
would be to verify safety every time a novel environment is encountered, but as we show in our
experiments, this approach still does not scale well.
Finally, note that our approach ensures safety for φsafe when X0 is the set of recoverable states.
B Proof of Theorem 3.3
Consider any x such that V (x) ≤ . To see (i), note that in the first constraint in (2), the second
term is negative since λ(x) ≥ 0, so V (x)− V (f (pi)(x)) ≥ 0. Thus, by Theorem 3.2, G is invariant.
Similarly, to see (ii), note that in the second constraint in (2), the second term is negative since
~µ(x) ≥ 0, so bsafe −Asafex ≥ 0. Thus, x ∈ Xsafe for all x ∈ G. Since G is invariant, it follows that
pi is safe from any x0 ∈ G.
C Proof of Theorem 3.5
Let x0, x1, ... be the trajectory generated using pishield from x0. We claim that for all t ∈ N, xt is either
(i) recoverable, or (ii) (x˜t, u˜t)-stable, where (x˜t, u˜t) is the auxiliary input to SHIELD in Algorithm 1
on step t. The base case t = 0 holds by assumption. Now, suppose that the inductive hypothesis
holds for t; we prove it holds for t+ 1. We consider three cases, corresponding to which of the three
branches in SHIELD is taken.
If the first branch is taken, then xt+1 = f (pˆi)(xt) is recoverable, so we are done. If the second branch
is taken, then xt is (x˜t, u˜t)-stable, so xt+1 = f (piLQR)(xt) is also (x˜t, u˜t)-stable. Furthermore, in this
case, x˜t+1 = x˜t and u˜t+1 = u˜t, so xt+1 is (x˜t+1, u˜t+1)-stable, so we are done.
If the third branch is taken, then xt must be recoverable, since it is not (x˜t, u˜t)-stable or the second
branch would have been taken. Thus, the trajectory ζ = (x′0, x
′
1, ..., x
′
t′) obtained by using pirec
from x′0 = x reaches a stable state after t
′ ∈ [T ] steps without leaving Xsafe. If t′ > 0, then
xt+1 = f
(pirec)(xt) = x
′
1 is the second state in ζ. Then, the trajectory ζ
′ = (x′1, ..., x
′
t′) reaches a
stable state after t′ − 1 steps, so xt+1 is recoverable as well.
We show that we cannot have t′ = 0. In particular, by the definition of recoverability, t′ = 0 implies
that xt is stable (i.e., ρ(xt)-stable). Since xt is not (x˜t, u˜t)-stable, we must have ρ(xt) 6= (x˜t, u˜t).
This condition can only happen if t > 0 and xt−1 takes the second branch in SHIELD. As a
consequence, it must be the case that xt−1 is (x˜t−1, u˜t−1)-stable, xt = f (piLQR)(xt−1), x˜t = x˜t−1,
and u˜t = u˜t−1. Then, xt must be (x˜t, u˜t)-stable, a contradiction. Thus, we cannot have t′ = 0.
Finally, if xt is recoverable, then by definition, we have xt ∈ Xsafe. Alternatively, if xt is (x˜t, u˜t)-
stable, then xt ∈ G for some invariant set G. By Theorem 3.3, G ⊆ Xsafe, so xt ∈ Xsafe.
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